Dharmesh and Venkat broke ground on a 21-unit Austin apartment build in 2021, budgeted at $5M. By 2026 the project had cost $10M after a lumber-to-steel pivot, interest accumulation, and pandemic supply-chain delays. Founderpath could not structure a deal that worked for both sides. Here’s exactly why — and what other B&M operators can learn about debt consolidation underwriting.
Total Project Cost
Units (5 + 6 + 10)
Outstanding 14% Notes
Latest Monthly Revenue
The full picture: an experienced development team, a 21-unit Austin build that cost double what they planned, and a mid-term-rental pivot that works — but a capital ask that didn’t fit.
The business
Business
Hummingbird Flats
Founders
Dharmesh Jawarani and Venkat Mallya
Location
Austin, Texas
Track record
Started developing 2016 · 14 single-family deals · $40M+ raised · 50M+ in sales
Investor returns to date
20%+ annualized
Project type
21-unit ground-up apartment build (5 two-bed, 6 one-bed, 10 studios)
Broke ground
2021
Certificate of Occupancy received
2026 — 5 years and 3 months later
Pivot strategy
Mid-Term Rentals (MTR) listed on Furnished Finder
MTR average vacancy
3% across 10 occupied units
The ask
Capital ask
$6.5 million equity check (full recapitalization)
Equity offered
88% of the project
Use of funds
Pay off 14% notes ($3.4M with accrued interest), free up cash flow
Total raise target
$10 million (would also fund 10-property MTR portfolio expansion)
Founder skin in the game
$850,000 retained equity
Underwater on sale
A $7.5M sale today implies a $2.5M+ loss
The outcome
Outcome
No offer made
Founderpath’s ideal structure
$1M lease-purchase or fixed-return debt deal — neither was viable
Why no debt deal
Bank held full collateral on the building — no carveout possible
Why no equity deal
88% majority equity exposure was outside Founderpath’s mandate
Founders’ counter
Offered the entire building at $7.5M (a $2.5M loss to themselves)
Outcome on counter
Founderpath declined — no fit on shape or size
The MTR pivot works. The capital stack doesn’t. That’s the entire story of why this deal didn’t close on camera.
Original construction budget (2021)
$5,000,000
Actual construction cost
$6,100,000
Land + design + permitting
$1,500,000
Time-delay and interest cost
$2,400,000
Total all-in cost
$10,000,000
Short-term (Airbnb-style, third party)
Under $800
Third-party platform retained 50%+ of revenue. Best month was $5,500 across 5 units.
Long-term (12+ months)
$1,200
Filled slowly. Below market for the build quality.
Mid-term (under 12 months)
$1,800–$1,950
Sells out instantly via Furnished Finder. 3% average vacancy across 10 units.
At full MTR occupancy, the building generates close to $50K/month — almost double the most recent month’s actuals. That trajectory is what the founders were trying to recapitalize.
Hummingbird Flats is a real business with a real pivot. Three structures were proposed on camera. None of them fit. Here’s the underwriting math behind each decline.
The construction lender (Verizon Bank, $5.5M loan at 5.25%) had the full collateral package on the building. Founderpath could not get a carveout on the lease agreements as collateral, which would have been the only structure that fit. Without secured cash flows to lend against, the deal couldn’t be priced as debt.
The founders needed a $6.5M equity check to take out the 14% notes. In exchange they offered 88% of the project. Founderpath does not write majority-control checks — the entire model is built around minority, non-dilutive capital. An 88% equity stake with limited operational influence is a private-equity recapitalization, not a Founderpath deal.
Founderpath proposed buying the lease agreements at a 10% discount — effectively a $900K check that would repay $1M as the leases collected, secured by those leases. The bank’s collateral package made this impossible: the leases were already pledged to the construction lender. There was no clean security structure available.
The founders countered with an offer to sell the entire building at $7.5M — accepting a $2.5M loss themselves. Founderpath declined: the asset is sound and the MTR model works, but a single-asset 7-figure real-estate purchase isn’t the firm’s lane. Founderpath funds operating businesses, not property acquisitions.
An operating business with stabilized cash flow, an unencumbered or carveable collateral package, and a debt-consolidation use-of-funds story is exactly what Founderpath underwrites every day. The Hummingbird situation was 1) too levered already, 2) too capital-intensive on a single asset, and 3) too restricted on collateral. Different shape, different deal.
Debt consolidation financing for brick and mortar operators →Hummingbird didn’t close because the capital structure was wrong, not because the business was. Founderpath funds brick and mortar operators with non-dilutive debt-consolidation capital from $50K to $5M when the underlying business has stabilized cash flow and a clean collateral structure. Here’s the bar.
Annual revenue
$250K+ in recurring operating revenue (not asset value)
Operating history
12+ months of stabilized cash flow on the asset being financed
Collateral structure
Either unencumbered cash flow or a clean carveout from senior debt
Use of funds
Specific debt being consolidated — original principal, current rate, payoff cost
Cap-table cleanliness
Founderpath funds minority capital — operator retains majority and control
Equity given up
Zero on a debt deal · small warrant only on hybrid structures
The Hummingbird non-deal teaches more about Founderpath’s underwriting bar than most closes. Five things every B&M operator should take from it.
Founderpath needs the operator to retain majority equity and operational control. When the only structure that works for a recapitalization is an 88% equity check, you’re no longer underwriting a Founderpath deal — you’re underwriting a private-equity buyout. Keep your cap table clean and your senior debt paydownable, and the universe of capital partners stays open.
Hummingbird’s lumber-to-steel pivot is a textbook case of how a single market shock destroys a construction budget. A $5M project became a $10M project because of $1M in COVID lumber spikes, $1.5M of land/permitting/design costs, and $2.4M of accumulated interest. When you raise capital for a buildout, build in 30%+ contingency.
The 5.25% Verizon Bank construction loan looks great on paper. But that loan held all the building collateral, which meant Founderpath couldn’t get a carveout on the lease cash flows. A higher-rate loan with looser collateral terms would have left more flexibility for second-lien capital. Every collateral lockup costs optionality.
The MTR pivot is genuinely impressive. Short-term rentals through a third party returned less than $800/unit; long-term leases hit $1,200; mid-term rentals via Furnished Finder hit $1,800–$1,950 with 3% vacancy. The founders read the market and adapted. That operating discipline is what made everyone want to find a structure that worked.
Founderpath passed honestly because no structure worked for both sides. That clarity is the cleanest service a capital partner can provide. Operators reading this: if a lender can’t cleanly explain their collateral and security position in the deal, they shouldn’t be at the table.
The Hummingbird Flats episode, explained.
No. Three structures were proposed on camera — an $1M lease-purchase deal, a fixed-return debt deal of about $500K to $1M, and a $7.5M whole-building purchase. None of the three were viable given the existing capital stack and Founderpath’s underwriting mandate. The episode ended without an offer.
The construction lender (Verizon Bank, $5.5M loan at 5.25%) held the full collateral package on the building, including the lease agreements. Founderpath proposed buying the leases at a 10% discount as a debt-like instrument, but the bank’s collateral lockup made that carveout impossible. Without secured cash flows, there was no clean security structure.
The founders offered 88% equity in exchange for a $6.5M check. Founderpath’s mandate is minority, non-dilutive capital — operators retain majority equity and full operational control. An 88% stake with limited operational involvement is a private-equity recapitalization, which is a different product entirely.
The founders offered to sell the building at $7.5M, accepting a $2.5M loss themselves. Founderpath funds operating businesses, not single-asset real-estate purchases. The MTR pivot is sound, but a building acquisition isn’t the firm’s lane.
Mid-term rentals are leases under 12 months but longer than vacation rentals — typically 1 to 6 months for traveling nurses, relocations, and corporate housing. Hummingbird listed on Furnished Finder for a $49–$129 listing fee and saw rents jump from $1,200 (long-term) to $1,800–$1,950 (mid-term) with only 3% vacancy. The MTR model genuinely worked for the asset.
COVID lumber prices spiked 5–7x, forcing a redesign from lumber to steel framing. By the time construction restarted, steel had doubled and lumber had collapsed. Total cost increase: $1M on materials, $1.5M of land + permitting + design, and $2.4M of accumulated interest carrying cost over five years. The fundamentals of the project were buried under timing.
A stabilized operating revenue of at least $250K annually, 12+ months of MTR cash flow data, and a refinanced senior debt structure that allowed a Founderpath carveout on a portion of the lease cash flows. With those three conditions, a $500K to $1M debt-consolidation deal is exactly the shape Founderpath underwrites.
Because the underwriting transparency matters. Operators learn more from the deals that don’t close than from the ones that do — and seeing exactly why a structure didn’t fit is the best preparation for raising capital that does. The Hummingbird episode is a working tutorial on collateral, cap-table cleanliness, and project-finance discipline.
Every word from the conversation between Nathan and Dharmesh and Venkat, lightly cleaned for readability.