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Customer Concentration CalculatorEnter or paste your customers and their recurring revenue to see what share your largest account holds, how concentrated the whole book is, and exactly what it would cost you in revenue, gross profit, runway and borrowing capacity if your biggest customer left. Free, no signup, and every figure is computed on your device.
Gross margin on recurring revenue (%)
Monthly operating costs
Cash in the bank
Capital as a multiple of MRR
Flag a customer above this share (%)
The business is materially exposed to a small number of accounts. That can be entirely rational — early customers are often large ones — but it is a fact to plan around rather than one to discover during diligence.
Label from the DOJ/FTC 2023 Merger Guidelines HHI thresholds, used descriptively. It is not a lending rule, and it does not know your contract lengths.3 customers are at or above your 10% flag: Northwind Logistics, Cedar Health, Brightline Retail.
| Customer | MRR | Share | Cumulative |
|---|---|---|---|
| Northwind Logistics | $9,200 | 44.2% | 44.2% |
| Cedar Health | $4,100 | 19.7% | 63.9% |
| Brightline Retail | $2,600 | 12.5% | 76.4% |
| Vantage Studios | $1,750 | 8.4% | 84.9% |
| Halcyon Legal | $1,200 | 5.8% | 90.6% |
| Orbit Fitness | $900 | 4.3% | 95.0% |
| Pinegrove Schools | $640 | 3.1% | 98.0% |
| Tessellate Design | $410 | 2.0% | 100.0% |
Concentration is only dangerous when it meets a thin balance sheet. The same customer leaving is an inconvenience with twelve months of cash and an emergency with two. Diversifying the revenue takes quarters; widening the gap between a bad month and a fatal one can be done now. Founderpath funds SaaS companies up to $5M against the recurring revenue they already have, repaid out of it, with no equity and no board seats.
Founderpath starts at $10K MRR (about $120K ARR) of recurring software revenue. Below that, or if your revenue is not recurring, this is not the right fit yet — a bank line of credit or an SBA loan is the more realistic route. Concentration is one input among many, and nothing on this page is a credit decision.
Customer concentration is the share of your revenue that sits with your largest customers. Customer concentration risk is what happens to the business when one of them leaves. The two are not the same number, and confusing them is the most common mistake founders make when a lender or an acquirer raises the subject.
A bootstrapped SaaS company almost always starts concentrated. The first serious customer is, by definition, a large share of a small book, and landing a big logo early is a good outcome rather than a warning sign. The risk is not the percentage on its own. It is the percentage combined with how easily that customer could leave: contract length, notice period, renewal date, how deeply the product is embedded, who the champion is and whether they are still there. A 35% customer on a signed three-year agreement with eighteen months to run is a different exposure from a 35% customer on a rolling monthly plan, and no ratio can tell those two apart.
This matters commercially because concentration shows up in three places at once: what your company is worth, what you can borrow against it, and how a single renewal conversation feels. The calculator above measures all three effects from the same customer list, and the rest of this page explains what the numbers mean. It sits alongside the other financial health tools and the wider SaaS metrics hub.
The headline figure is a share. Divide one customer's recurring revenue by total recurring revenue:
Customer concentration = Customer MRR ÷ Total MRR × 100
On $30,000 of total MRR, a customer paying $9,000 a month is at 30%. Founders usually report the top one, top three, top five and top ten together, because those four numbers describe different problems. A 30% top customer with a top five at 45% is one big account in an otherwise healthy book. A 30% top customer with a top five at 90% is a business with five customers.
Use recurring revenue, not billings. Setup fees, migration work and one-off services inflate whichever customer happened to buy them this month and disappear next month, which is why the calculator excludes one-time revenue by default. Start from the same MRR figure you get out of the MRR calculator so the denominators agree.
Top-N shares describe the head of the distribution but say nothing about the tail. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index fixes that by squaring every customer's percentage share and adding them up:
HHI = Σ (each customer's share of revenue, as a percentage)²
Squaring is what makes it useful: it weights large customers far more heavily than small ones, so the index moves when the shape of the book changes rather than when you add another tiny account. A single customer scores 10,000. Ten equal customers score 1,000. The reciprocal is easier to hold in your head — 10,000 divided by HHI gives the effective customer count, the number of equally sized customers that would produce the same concentration. A book of forty accounts with an effective count of three is three customers wearing a crowd as a disguise, and that is precisely the situation a spreadsheet of forty rows hides.
| HHI | Descriptive label | What that usually looks like |
|---|---|---|
| Below 1,500 | Unconcentrated | No customer much above 10%; roughly seven or more equally weighted accounts |
| 1,500 – 2,500 | Moderately concentrated | A largest customer somewhere in the twenties; four to six effective accounts |
| Above 2,500 | Highly concentrated | A largest customer above 30%, or a top three carrying most of the revenue |
The 1,500 and 2,500 thresholds are the U.S. DOJ/FTC 2023 Merger Guidelines figures, which describe market concentration rather than customer books. The arithmetic transfers exactly; the regulatory meaning does not. Treat the labels as vocabulary for a conversation, not as a grade.
Not as a universal number, and anyone quoting one is quoting a convention rather than a rule. The convention worth knowing is the disclosure trigger in SEC Regulation S-K Item 101(c): a public registrant must name any customer accounting for 10% or more of consolidated revenue. That is why 10% turns up so often in diligence questionnaires and why the calculator uses it as the default flag. It is a transparency threshold for public companies, not a safety threshold for private ones, which is also why the field is editable.
In practice, what changes the answer is everything the percentage cannot see. Contract term and notice period decide how much warning you would get. Customer credit quality decides whether the revenue is at risk from their finances as well as their choices. Switching costs and depth of integration decide how hard leaving actually is. Renewal history and expansion behaviour decide whether the relationship is growing or quietly ending — the net revenue retention calculator and a cohort analysis answer that better than a snapshot does. Two companies with an identical 30% top customer can be in completely different positions, and the honest way to present concentration is with those facts attached.
The revenue line is the part founders model. It is rarely the part that hurts first. Losing a customer at 30% of a $30,000 MRR book removes $9,000 a month and $108,000 of ARR, but your operating costs do not fall by 30% the same week. At an 80% gross margin that is $7,200 a month of gross profit gone against an expense base that is unchanged, which is why a concentrated loss usually converts a modest burn into a serious one overnight. The calculator runs that arithmetic against the cash and cost figures you supply, in the same shape as the runway calculator.
The second-order effects run further than most founders expect. Concentration is an input to what you can borrow: capital sized against recurring revenue falls when the revenue falls, and the debt capacity calculator shows why the serviceability constraint tightens at the same time as the revenue one. It is also an input to what the company is worth — buyers apply a discount for revenue that could walk, so the multiple you model in the SaaS valuation calculator is not independent of the distribution you just measured, which is also why a valuation built on verified revenue data reads differently from one built on a multiple alone. And if the largest account was also your lowest churn, its departure moves your churn rate for a year.
Start with what not to do. Do not fire, shrink or under-serve a good large customer to improve a ratio. The ratio is a description of the business, not a target to optimise, and trading real revenue for a better denominator makes the company smaller and no safer. Every genuine remedy either grows the rest of the book or makes the large account harder to lose.
Lengthen the contract before you worry about the share. Moving a 30% customer from monthly to annual, or annual to multi-year, does not change a single number the calculator reports — and it changes the risk more than any of them. Notice period and renewal date are the real exposure.
Grow the tail rather than cutting the head. Concentration falls fastest when smaller accounts expand. That is a retention and expansion problem, and it is measured with net revenue retention rather than with new logos. Reaching 100%+ NRR in the rest of the book dilutes the top account without anyone losing revenue.
Widen the champion base inside the big account.Single-threaded revenue is concentration inside concentration. If one person's departure could end the relationship, the exposure is worse than the percentage suggests.
Separate the concentration you can fix from the concentration you should finance. If your book is concentrated because you serve a small number of large enterprises well, that is a business model rather than a defect. The right response is a balance sheet that can absorb one loss, not a strategy that abandons the customers you are best at serving.
Any lender underwriting recurring revenue is really underwriting how durable that revenue is, so concentration is one of the first things they look at. It rarely disqualifies a company on its own. What it does is change the terms: a more conservative advance rate against the concentrated portion, more attention on contract length and renewal dates, and questions about the top accounts by name. The same logic applies to an acquirer, which is why concentration disclosed early reads as command of the numbers and concentration discovered late reads as a surprise.
Equity is the expensive way to solve this. Selling a permanent share of the company to insure against a renewal that will probably happen is a bad trade for a profitable, growing business. Recurring revenue financing is the closer match: it is sized against contracted revenue, repaid out of it, and costs no ownership. The broader non-dilutive funding options are worth reading alongside it, and Founderpath funds SaaS companies from $10K MRR up to $5M against recurring revenue, with no equity and no board seats. Concentration is one input among many in that assessment, and nothing on this page is a credit decision or a reproduction of anyone's underwriting.
Everything on this page is computed in your browser. Customer names, revenue figures and any file you import are parsed on your device and never transmitted, stored or logged — the analytics on this page record that a calculation happened, never what was in it. The CSV export defaults to anonymous ranks rather than customer names, because a concentration summary is exactly the kind of file that gets forwarded.
Shares are computed on recurring revenue, with one-time revenue excluded unless you switch it on. HHI is the sum of squared percentage shares on the conventional 0–10,000 scale. The debt-capacity line applies a multiple you choose to your recurring revenue and shows the revenue constraint only — it deliberately ignores serviceability, existing debt and cash flow, all of which the debt capacity calculator models properly. More tools for the rest of the picture are on the free tools hub.